Spiegel Online: Tensions Rise in Greece as Austerity Measures Backfire

Tensions Rise in Greece as Austerity Measures Backfire

Tensions Rise in Greece as Austerity Measures Backfire

By Corinna Jessen in Athens

The austerity measures that were supposed to fix Greece's problems are dragging down the country's economy. Stores are closing, tax revenues are falling and unemployment has hit an unbelievable 70 percent in some places. Frustrated workers are threatening to strike back.

The feast of the Assumption of Mary on Aug. 15 is the high point of summer in the Greek Orthodox world. Here in one of the country's many churches, believers pray to the Virgin for mercy, with many of them falling to their knees.

The newspaper Ta Nea has recommended that the Greek government adopt the very same approach -- the country's leaders have to hope that Mary comes up with a miracle to save Greece from a serious crisis, the paper writes. Without divine intervention, the newspaper suggested, it will be a difficult autumn for the Mediterranean state.

This dire prognosis comes even despite Athens' massive efforts to sort out the country's finances. The government's draconian austerity measures have managed to reduce the country's budget deficit by an almost unbelievable 39.7 percent, after previous governments had squandered tax money and falsified statistics for years. The measures have reduced government spending by a total of 10 percent, 4.5 percent more than the EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF) had required.

The problem is that the austerity measures have in the meantime affected every aspect of the country's economy. Purchasing power is dropping, consumption is taking a nosedive and the number of bankruptcies and unemployed are on the rise. The country's gross domestic product shrank by 1.5 percent in the second quarter of this year. Tax revenue, desperately needed in order to consolidate the national finances, has dropped off. A mixture of fear, hopelessness and anger is brewing in Greek society.

Unemployment Rates of up to 70 Percent

Nikos Meletis is neatly dressed, and his mid-range car is clean and tidy. Meletis used to earn a good living at a shipbuilding company in Perama, a port opposite the island of Salamis. "At the moment, I'm living off my savings," the 54-year-old welder says, standing in front of a silent harbor full of moored ships.

Meletis is a day laborer who used to work up to 300 days a year; this year he has only managed to scrape together 25 days' work so far. That gives him 25 health insurance stamps, when he needs 100 in order to insure himself and his family -- including his wife, who has cancer. "How am I supposed to pay for the hospital?" Meletis asks. Unemployment benefits of at most €460 ($590) per month are available for a maximum of one year -- and only if he can produce at least 150 stamps from the past 15 months.

There's hardly a worker in the shipbuilding district of Perama who could still manage that. Unemployment in the city hovers between 60 and 70 percent, according to a study conducted by the University of Piraeus. While 77 percent of Greek shipping companies indicate they are satisfied with the quality of work done in Perama, nearly 50 percent still send their ships to be repaired in Turkey, Korea or China. Costs are too high in Greece, they say. The country, they argue, has too much bureaucracy and too many strikes, with labor disputes often delaying delivery times.

Perama is certainly an unusually extreme case. But the shipyards' decline provides a telling example of the Greek economy's increasing inability to compete. Barely any of the country's industries can keep up with international competition in terms of productivity, and experts expect the country's gross domestic product to fall by 4 percent over the course of the entire year. Germany, by way of comparison, is hoping for growth of up to 3 percent.

Sales Figures Dropping Everywhere

Prime Minister George Papandreou's austerity package has seriously shaken the Greek economy. The package included reducing civil servants' salaries by up to 20 percent and slashing retirement benefits, while raising numerous taxes. The result is that Greeks have less and less money to spend and sales figures everywhere are dropping, spelling catastrophe for a country where 70 percent of economic output is based on private consumption.

A short jaunt through Athens' shopping streets reveals the scale of the decline. Fully a quarter of the store windows on Stadiou Street bear red signs reading "Enoikiazetai" -- for rent. The National Confederation of Hellenic Commerce (ESEE) calculates that 17 percent of all shops in Athens have had to file for bankruptcy.

Things aren't any better in the smaller towns. Chalkidona was, until just a few years ago, a hub for trucking traffic in the area around Thessaloniki. Two main streets, lined with fast food restaurants and stores catering to truckers, intersect in the small, dismal town. Maria Lialiambidou's house sits directly on the main trucking route. Rent from a pastry shop on the ground floor of the building used to provide her with €350 per month, an amount that helped considerably in supplementing her widow's pension of €320.

These days, though, Kostas, the man who ran the pastry shop, who people used to call a "penny-pincher," can no longer afford the rent. Here too, a huge "Enoikiazetai" banner stretches across the shopfront. No one wants to rent the store. Neither are there any takers for an empty butcher's shop a few meters further on.

A sign on the other side of the street advertises "Sakis' Restaurant." The owner, Sakis, is still hanging on, with customers filling one or two of the restaurant's tables now and then. "There's really no work for me here anymore," says one Albanian employee, who goes by the name Eleni in Greece. "Many others have already gone back to Albania, where it's not any worse than here. We'll see when I have to go too."

No Way Out

The entire country is in the grip of a depression. Everything seems to be going downhill. The spiral is continuing unabated, and there is no clear way out. The worse part, however, is the fact that hardly anyone still hopes that things will improve one day.

The country's unemployment rate makes this trend particularly clear. In 2009, it was 9.5 percent. This year it may rise to 12.1 percent and economists expect it to reach 14.3 percent in 2011. Those, though, are only the official numbers, which were provided by Angel Gurría, secretary general of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Greek trade union association GSEE considers those numbers far too optimistic. It considers 20 percent to be a more likely figure for 2011. This would put the unemployment rate as high as it was in 1960, when hundreds of thousands of Greeks were forced to emigrate. Meanwhile, purchasing power has fallen to its 1984 level, according to the GSEE.

'Things Are Starting to Simmer'

Menelaos Givalos, a professor of political science at Athens University, has appeared on television, warning viewers that the worst times are still to come. He predicts a large wave of layoffs starting in September, with "extreme social consequences."

"Everything is getting more expensive, I'm hardly earning any money, and then I'm supposed to pay more taxes to help save the country? How is that supposed to work?" asks Nikos Meletis, the shipbuilder. His friends, gathered in a small cafeteria on the pier in Perama, are gradually growing more vocal. They are all unemployed, desperate and angry at the politicians who got them into this mess. There is no sympathy here for any of the political parties and no longer any for the unions either.

"They only organize strikes to serve their own interests!" shouts one man, whose name is Panayiotis Peretridis. "The only thing that interests me anymore is my daily wage. A loaf of bread is my political party. I want to help my country -- give me work and I'll pay taxes! But our honor as first-class skilled workers, as heads of families, as Greeks, is being dragged through the dirt!"

"If you take away my family's bread, I'll take you down -- the government needs to know that," Meletis says. "And don't call us anarchists if that happens! We're heads of our families and we're desperate."

He predicts the situation will only become more heated. "Things are starting to simmer here," he says. "And at some point they're going to explode."

How I would deal with the European debt crisis.

If I were Emperor of Europe here is what I would do: I would have the European Central Bank (ECB) implicitly guarantee Greek debt by offering to buy Greek debt at some particular interest rate and then pay for the purchase of Greek debt by issuing a "Eurozone Bond" backed by the full faith and credit of all the countries in the Eurozone.

The buying of Greek debt would not be inflationary since the ECB would effectively be sterilizing the purchase of Greek debt with the issuance of Eurozone debt. It would also relieve the fiscal pressure on the countries who are putting up government funds to help shore up the Eurozone. These countries could still--in partnership with the ECB--exercise control and impose all the austerity conditions they want.

This would also help push the Euro ever so slightly toward its full potential as a competitor currency of the dollar since it would finally create a true Eurozone debt instrument. Obviously, though, the market would not be very large or liquid but perhaps this market could be opened up to other countries. While the EU does not seem overly concerned with the problem of moral hazard it would be relatively easy to limit countries from taking advantage of this market if the EU actually started to enforce their rules governing debt to gdp ratios.

I am double minded about what interest rate to charge the Greeks. A penalty rate seems appropriate, but obviously that may only make it more difficult for Greece to pay down it's debts. At any rate, some kind of risk premium above what the ECB would get on the Eurozone instrument seems appropriate and would be profitable for the ECB. And if the Greeks finally do default? Well, then the Germans can put their real money to work.

Perhaps unfortunately, I do not run Europe and the ECB seems like a profoundly conservative and unimaginative institution. That may be a necessary thing in Europe, it may also be a major liability for Europe to have monetary policy nonexistent at the national level and unhelpful at the supra-national level. While the ECB has been engaged in what the Wall Street Journal calls a "stealth bailout" of Europeans banks holding Greek debt they may do well to push things further. Legal and political realities notwithstanding.

Simple explanations for global financial instability and the cure: Keep it simple

Simple explanations for global financial instability and the cure: Keep it simple

Jacopo Carmassi Daniel Gros Stefano Micossi © voxEU.org

13 August 2009

Why is there so much disagreement about the causes of the crisis? This column says that lax monetary policy and excessive leverage are to blame. It argues that many alleged causes are simply symptoms of these policy errors. If that is correct, then the recommended corrective is remarkably simple – there is no need for intrusive regulatory measures constraining non-bank intermediaries and innovative financial instruments.
A remarkable feature of the burgeoning literature on the global financial crisis is vast disagreement about its main causes. Symptoms are often treated as autonomous developments requiring separate correction. There is thus a high risk that the legitimate pursuit of a more stable financial system will lead to a potpourri of excessive and damaging regulatory restrictions. In hope of reducing that risk, we offer a simplified reading of the factors leading to the financial crisis and accordingly simple policy recommendations (Carmassi, Gros, and Micossi 2010).

The ingredients of speculative bubbles

Recent events feature three main ingredients that are persistently observed in bubbles. First, there was abundant liquidity in world capital markets, fed by large payment imbalances, notably a large and persistent current account deficit in the US financed by ample flows of capital from emerging and oil-exporting countries. These “global” imbalances fostered an unsustainable explosion of financial assets and liabilities.

The second main ingredient was a credit boom leading to unsustainable leverage (the ratio of debt to equity), and the third was financial innovation, including the explosion of securitisation and derivatives and the “originate to distribute” model, which led to a significant deterioration in lending standards. The key point is that the innovations were instrumental in allowing an increase in leverage, as they moved risks still borne by the originators off of their balance sheets, reduced capital requirements with risk mitigation techniques such as credit derivatives, and embedded leverage in the “equity” tranches of structured products.

Leverage in Europe

Higher aggregate leverage generally indicates less capacity to absorb losses. It is not possible to establish a universal benchmark for excessive leverage, as different financial systems can support quite different ratios of credit to GDP. However, rapid increases in this ratio have been identified as reliable predictors of financial crises.

This warning signal was certainly audible in Europe before 2007-08. First, the increase in economy-wide leverage (measured by the debt-to-GDP ratio) was higher in the euro area than in the US. The increase between 1999 and 2007 amounted to 100% of GDP for the euro area, while in the US it was “only” 80% of GDP. Households’ leverage increased strongly in the US (40% of GDP) and much less so in the euro area. Financial sector leverage, however, increased more in the euro area (about 70% of GDP compared to 40% in the US).
As may be seen from the upper quadrant of Figure 1, large EU cross-border banks had an average leverage ratio close to 35; there were peaks of 70 and even 80 for some British, German, and Swiss banks.

Figure 1. Leverage and exposure to market risk of the largest EU and US banks, 1998-2008

Leverage: total liabilities/net tangible equity. Exposure to market risk: total securities/net tangible equity. Data on 2008 are estimates. Source: R&S - Mediobanca 2009.
Monetary anchors for ever-rising asset prices

Monetary policy in the US was accommodating throughout the 1990s and became aggressively expansionary in the 2000s; nominal interest rates fell below levels recommend by the Taylor rule (and below the inflation rate in 2003-04).

A key feature of a speculative bubble is the attendant anomalous convergence of expectations that occurs when a growing share of investors believes that prices can only go up and that the risk of reversal somehow disappears. The phenomenon of convergent expectations in the stock market was documented by Robert Shiller’s surveys of investor sentiment. Shiller believes that convergence of expectations is a natural, endogenous phenomenon engendered by such things as a long-established benevolent economic environment and economic innovations announcing a new era of prosperity. In his view, monetary policy is driven by the same psychological forces that feed the bubble and cannot be considered exogenous (Shiller 2000).

However, a straightforward alternative is that monetary policy itself provided the anchor for the convergence of expectations, based on the consistent record that any decline in asset prices would be countered by the Federal Reserve with vigorous monetary expansion. Indeed, Alan Greenspan had just arrived at the Federal Reserve at the time of the 1987 stock market crash; he promptly reacted by aggressively lowering policy interest rates. He did it again in 1998 at the time of the LTCM crisis that followed the East Asian and Russian crisis, and even more aggressively after the end of the dot.com bubble in 2000. In all these episodes, there were no adverse effects of falling asset prices on economic activity and subsequently stock prices recovered.

The pattern is clear – the Fed repeatedly and systematically intervened to counter “negative bubbles”, while it remained passive when confronted with accelerating credit and asset prices. This policy approach, long established and clearly announced for over a decade, must have played an important role in bringing about convergent expectations of ever-rising asset prices, which eventually destabilised financial markets and the economy. Such an asymmetric monetary policy creates a gigantic moral hazard problem, whereby all agents expect to be rescued from their mistakes. This is where excessive leverage and excessive maturity transformation become relevant.

Banks and leveraged credit booms

A feature of banks that has traditionally justified special regulation is that deposits can be withdrawn on demand at par value. Banks normally do not keep sufficient liquidity to pay back all depositors at the same time, which exposes them to the risk of a run when depositors start to doubt their solidity. Bank runs are contagious and may generate systemic instability.
Non-bank intermediaries do not pose an equal threat to financial stability, since their liabilities are not redeemable on demand at par. They are not exposed to the risk of customer runs since their liabilities are market-priced like their assets. When financial intermediaries that raise money from capital markets by issuing securities make wrong investment decisions, their investors will lose their money without further repercussions for the financial system at large.
US investment banks raised a growing share – eventually, up to a quarter of their total liabilities – of their funds in the wholesale money market but without banks’ public safeguards and prudential constraints. When confidence collapsed, their liquidity evaporated and pushed them over the brink, without much regard for the quality of their assets.

An apparent puzzle is the behaviour of European universal banks, which combine commercial and investment banking activities within the same organisation, that managed to become not only overleveraged, but also overexposed to toxic assets as much as the riskiest Wall Street investment banks, despite prima facie more stringent regulation (Figure 1). This was partly due to lax oversight by national regulators who wanted their national champions to take larger market shares and participate in the great gains of finance. However, the key factor in explaining EU banks’ leverage was risk-mitigation techniques made possible, and indeed encouraged, by the Basel capital rules.

The fundamental problem with these rules is that they create room for reducing capital requirements by choosing counterparties or tailoring operations to legal features so as to economise capital; moreover, once Basel requirements were met, management felt exonerated from any further scrutiny of actual risks. Capital requirements came to be wholly misinterpreted; during the long upswing in stock prices, keeping a buffer of capital over the minimum was seen as a waste of resources, so that the floor became a ceiling.
anagement demands for tools to reduce capital requirements were met by Wall Street – eager to find outlet for the new breed of structured securities – by multiplying the offer of credit default swaps on those securities and securing Triple-A rating for their senior tranches. Besides, Basel capital rules directly encouraged the explosion of the interbank market, later a major source of instability, since they assigned a low ranking to assets such as interbank deposits and bonds held vis-à-vis other banks.

The problem was compounded by a definition of capital that made as many items with little resemblance to equity – such as subordinated debt and other hybrid capital instruments – eligible instruments. As a result, while the target ratio between regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets for European banks was 8%, the ratio between cash and equity and the same assets did not exceed 2%.

Therefore, the key to avoiding repeating this crisis is setting adequate capital requirements that cannot be circumvented for all intermediaries able to raise funds redeemable on demand at par. The simple way of doing it is to set capital requirements with reference to total assets, with no further distinction – 8% should be 8% in cash and equity, with no gimmicks allowed. All risks effectively borne by a bank, regardless of their legal attribution or geographical location, should be included in the asset definition, and accounting principles should be modified accordingly.
Legally separating commercial and investment banking activities or prohibiting banks from undertaking particular activities would not be necessary, which is advantageous considering the enormous hurdles involved in implementing such separation for large cross-border banking groups. At most, one could instead envisage higher capital charges on proprietary trading and lending to highly leveraged financial organisations, so as to reduce their profitability, as currently explored by the Financial Stability Board.

Conclusion

We have argued that the massive financial instability of 2007-8 was primarily the result of lax monetary policy, mainly in the US. The regulatory system compounded this error by tolerating excessive leverage and maturity transformation by banks in the US and Europe. Innovation did contribute to credit expansion and instability, but in all likelihood, without lax money and excessive leverage, reckless bets on asset price increases would have been much reduced.
The logical conclusion is that a repeat of this instability could be avoided in the future by correcting those two policy faults. By and large, there is no need for intrusive regulatory measures constraining non-bank intermediaries and innovative financial instruments. Our main message in designing the new rules for the global financial system is “keep it simple”.

References
Carmassi, Jacopo, Daniel Gros and Stefano Micossi (2010). “The Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Cures”, forthcoming in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, No.1, January 2010, Special Issue on Europe and the Global Financial Turmoil.

Shiller, Robert J. (2000). “Measuring Bubble Expectations and Investor Confidence” Journal of Behavioral Finance, 1542-7579, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 49 – 60.