Showing posts with label delong. Show all posts
Showing posts with label delong. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Delong Op-Ed: Sympathy for Greenspan

J. Bradford DeLong

29 June 2009





In the circles in which I travel, there is near-universal consensus that America’s monetary authorities made three serious mistakes that contributed to and exacerbated the financial crisis.

This consensus is almost always qualified by declarations that the United States has been well served by its Federal Reserve chairmen since at least Paul Volcker’s tenure, and that those of us who have not sat in that seat know that we would have made worse mistakes. Nevertheless, the consensus is that US policymakers erred when:

· the decision was made to eschew principles-based regulation and allow the shadow banking sector to grow with respect to its leverage and its compensation schemes, in the belief that the government’s guarantee of the commercial banking system was enough to keep us out of trouble;

· the Fed and the Treasury decided, once we were in trouble, to nationalise AIG and pay its bills rather than to support its counterparties, which allowed financiers to pretend that their strategies were fundamentally sound;

· the Fed and the Treasury decided to let Lehman Brothers go into uncontrolled bankruptcy in order to try to teach financiers that having an ill-capitalised counterparty was not without risk, and that people should not expect the government to come to their 
rescue automatically.

There is, however, a lively debate about whether there was a fourth big mistake: Alan Greenspan’s decision in 2001-2004 to push and keep nominal interest rates on US Treasury securities very low in order to try to keep the economy near full employment. In other words, should Greenspan have kept interest rates higher and triggered a recession in order to avert the growth of a housing bubble? If we push interest rates up, Greenspan thought, millions of Americans would become unemployed, to no one’s benefit. If interest rates were allowed to fall, these extra workers would be employed building houses and making things to sell to all the people whose incomes come from the construction sector.

Full employment is better than high unemployment if it can be accomplished without inflation, Greenspan thought. If a bubble develops, and if the bubble does not deflate but collapses, threatening to cause a depression, the Fed would have the policy tools to short-circuit that chain. In hindsight, Greenspan was wrong. But the question is: was the bet that Greenspan made a favourable one?

Whenever in the future the US finds itself in a situation like 2003, should it try to keep the economy near full employment even at some risk of a 
developing bubble?

I am genuinely unsure as to which side I come down on in this debate. Central bankers have long recognised that it is imprudent to lower interest rates in pursuit of full employment if the consequence is an inflationary spiral. Some days I think that, in the future, central bankers must also recognise that it is imprudent to lower interest rates in pursuit of full employment when doing so risks causing an asset price bubble.

What I do know is that the way the issue is usually posed is wrong. People claim that Greenspan’s Fed “aggressively pushed interest rates below a natural level.” But what is the natural level? In the 1920’s, Swedish economist Knut Wicksell defined it as the interest rate at which, economy-wide, desired investment equals desired savings, implying no upward pressure on consumer prices, resource prices, or wages as aggregate demand outruns supply, and no downward pressure on these prices as supply exceeds demand.

On Wicksell’s definition — the best, and, in fact, the only definition I know of — the market interest rate was, if anything, above the natural interest rate in the early 2000’s: the threat was deflation, not accelerating inflation. The natural interest rate was low because, as the Fed’s current chairman Ben Bernanke explained at the time, the world had a global savings glut (or, rather, a global investment deficiency).

You can argue that Greenspan’s policies in the early 2000’s were wrong. But you cannot argue that he aggressively pushed the interest rate below its natural level. Rather, Greenspan’s mistake — if it was a mistake — was his failure to overrule the market and aggressively push the interest rate up above its natural rate, which would have deepened and prolonged the recession that 
started in 2001.

But today is one of those days when I don’t think that Greenspan’s failure to raise interest rates above the natural rate to generate high unemployment and avert the growth of a mortgage-finance bubble was a mistake. There were plenty of other mistakes that generated the catastrophe that faces us today.

J. Bradford DeLong, a former Assistant US Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration, is Professor of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley

In Cooperation With Project Syndicate

Can the Federal Reserve Shrink the Money Stock Rapidly Now that It Can Pay Interest on Reserves?

DeLong/Pimco: Can the Federal Reserve Shrink the Money Stock Rapidly Now that It Can Pay Interest on Reserves?

[Links work]
Tyler Cowen asks:

Marginal Revolution: Paying interest on reserves, and why it should be easy to disarm future inflationary pressures. Do I believe it?

The correct answer is "maybe."

If inflationary pressure comes because banks and others regain their confidence and seek to move their excess reserve deposits into higher-yielding dollar denominated assets, then the Federal Reserve can fix that with a flick of its wrist by raising the interest rate on deposits.

If inflationary pressure comes because banks and others fear a large dollar depreciation and seek to move their excess reserve deposits into non-dollar denominated assets, then the Federal Reserve is helpless, and the situation is dire--unless the Federal Reserve has gotten the authority to issue bonds and has preemptively used that authority to mop up the excess liquidity.

Paul McCulley of PIMCO:

PIMCO - Global Central Bank Focus June 2009 Exit Strategy: Most rational investors accept the dual proposition that a Fed funds rate pinned against zero and near-$800 billion of excess reserves sloshing around the banking system are not enduringly sustainable. This is the case despite the fact that most – though a smaller most – applaud the Fed for engineering these outcomes, so as to cut off the fat tail risk of deflationary Armageddon. The consensus overwhelmingly holds that once that fat tail has been cut off and then killed, borrowing from Colin Powell’s famous description of America’s strategy for running Iraq out of Kuwait, it will be necessary for the Fed to exit its extraordinarily accommodative strategy, hiking the Fed funds rate and soaking up all those excess reserves. It’s hard to argue with the basic thrust of this exit thesis. Because it’s basically right!

I must admit, however, that I’m perplexed that so many pundits put so much emphasis on the importance of the Fed soaking up excess reserves, as if it is a necessary condition for hiking the Fed funds rate. It is not. To be sure, it used to be, before the Fed had the legal authority to pay interest on reserves, which Congress granted last fall. Before then, the only way the Fed could achieve a meaningfully positive Fed funds rate target was to constrain the supply of reserves relative to the banking system’s demand for reserves, essentially required reserves. If there were excessive excess reserves, then the Fed funds rate would fall below the Fed’s target, as banks with excess would be willing to lend them out in the Fed funds market below the Fed funds target, given that if they simply left them at the Fed, they would earn nothing. But now, the Fed pays interest on banks’ excess reserves (presently at an interest rate of 0.25%, the top of the Fed’s 0% – 0.25% target band for the Fed funds rate). Thus, logic says that banks with excess reserves will not lend them in the Fed funds market at a rate appreciably lower than the Fed pays, but simply leave them on deposit at the Fed. Accordingly, the rate that the Fed pays on excess reserves should now act as a proximate floor for the Fed funds rate, even if there are huge excess reserves in the system. Thus, by hiking the rate it pays on excess reserves, the Fed now has the ability to enforce a rising Fed funds rate target – even before it “unwinds” its bloated balance sheet....

The Federal Reserve’s approach to supporting credit markets is... credit easing... focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets affects credit conditions.... [C]redit spreads are much wider and credit markets more dysfunctional in the United States today than was the case during the Japanese experiment with quantitative easing. To stimulate aggregate demand in the current environment, the Federal Reserve must focus its policies on reducing those spreads and improving the functioning of private credit markets more generally.... When markets are illiquid and private arbitrage is impaired by balance sheet constraints and other factors, as at present, one dollar of longer-term securities purchases is unlikely to have the same impact on financial markets and the economy as a dollar of lending to banks, which has in turn a different effect than a dollar of lending to support the commercial paper market.... [T]he stance of Fed policy in the current regime – in contrast to a QE regime – is not easily summarized by a single number....

Yes, I know that many of your eyes are probably glazing over about now, given my (and Ben’s) wonkishness. I’m sorry about that, but this is really, really important stuff to understand, given the widespread yammering about the need for the Fed to have an exit strategy to de-create all the excess reserves it has created, as if they are intrinsically the kindling for an (eventual) rip-roaring inflationary fire. They are not.... [W]e can categorically say that the near-zero Fed funds rate is not, for the moment, fueling an inflationary pace of aggregate demand growth.... And neither is the Fed’s Credit Easing.... Yes, in the fullness of time, zero Fed funds could conceptually re-ignite borrowers’ and lenders’ mojo. Indeed, that’s precisely the Fed’s objective. And if and when that objective is achieved, the Fed funds rate will need to be hiked.... But right now, the least of my worries, and I think the Fed’s, too, is the prospect for an overheated economy, putting too many idled resources, both labor and industrial capacity, back to work too quickly... it would be delightful if that were our primary worry! But it isn’t....

Chairman Bernanke and a number of his colleagues have talked about all these various tools, stressing they have plenty of potential doors in their exit strategy. And indeed they do, even though simply hiking the rate the Fed pays on excess reserves is the cleanest way to hike the Fed funds rate...

Friday, June 12, 2009

DeLong: What Are We, Chopped Liver?

From Bradford DeLong's "Grasping Reality with Both Hands":

Thomas Palley writes at TPM Cafe:

Are Heterodox Economists Just Unhappy Whiners? | TPMCafe: I was not planning to make further formal contributions to this discussion. However, Diane Coyle’s... claim is that heterodox economists are just unhappy whiners (a.k.a. whingers)..... I would like to give a couple of concrete examples that counter Diane Coyle’s claim that heterodox economists have nothing to complain about. So please bear with me.

The last time a paper on macroeconomics with a Keynesian structure was published in the American Economic Review was in the early 1980s. Send in such a paper and it will be immediately rejected as “old” economics. That is a matter of taste. There is simply no scientific basis for rejecting the Keynesian description of how the economy works.... Whereas the orthodox cup is filled with hard-core orthodox theory, the lip of orthodox policy practice quickly and easily slips into Keynesian thinking. This suggests Keynesians may be more right than the orthodox.

One example of such slippage is the scare with deflation during the last recession. Suddenly, the orthodoxy started arguing at the policy level that [de]flation could be damaging and the economy might get trapped with sustained unemployment (as happened in Japan). This was exactly what Keynes claimed, yet the orthodoxy dismissed (and still dismisses) Keynesian theory on the grounds that perfectly flexible prices and wages will automatically solve real world unemployment...

What am I, chopped liver? Apparently. Not only am I chopped liver, but others are chopped liver as well. Google MIT for its advanced macroeconomics reading lists and one of the first things that pops up is Jordi Gali's module: http://web.mit.edu/14.461/www/part1/readinglist.pdf. This looks to me to be nearly 200-proof modern Keynesianism--it may not be the kind of Keynesianism Palley likes, but Keynesianism it is.

Here are some of the readings:

Calvo, Guillermo (1983): “Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 383-398. Yun, Tack (1996): “Nominal Price Rigidity, Money Supply Endogeneity, and Business Cycles,” Journal of Monetary Economics 37, 345-370. King, Robert G., and Alexander L. Wolman (1996): “Inflation Targeting in a St. Louis Model of the 21st Century,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 78, no. 3. (NBER WP #5507). Fuhrer, Jeffrey C. and George R. Moore (1995): “Inflation Persistence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, February, pp 127-159. Galí, Jordi and Mark Gertler (1998): “Inflation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Analysis,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol 44, no. 2, 195-222. Sbordone, Argia (2002): “Prices and Unit Labor Costs: A New Test of Price Stickiness,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 49, no. 2, 265-292. Galí, Jordi, Mark Gertler, David López-Salido (2001): “European Inflation Dynamics,” European Economic Review vol. 45, no. 7, 1237-1270. Galí, Jordi, Mark Gertler, David López-Salido (2005): “Robustness of the Estimates of the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve,” Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming. Eichenbaum, Martin and Jonas D.M. Fisher (2004): “Evaluating the Calvo Model of Sticky Prices,” NBER WP 10617. Mankiw, N. Gregory and Ricardo Reis (2002): “Sticky Information vs. Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,” Quartely Journal of Economics, vol. CXVII, issue 4, 1295-1328. Rotemberg, Julio (1996): “Prices, Output, and Hours: An Empirical Analysis Based on a Sticky Price Model,” Journal of Monetary Economics 37, 505-533. Chari, V.V., Patrick J. Kehoe, Ellen R. McGrattan (2000): “Sticky Price Models of the Business Cycle: Can the Contract Multiplier Solve the Persistence Problem?,” Econometrica, vol. 68, no. 5, 1151-1180. Wolman, Alexander (1999): “Sticky Prices, Marginal Cost, and the Behavior of Inflation,” Economic Quarterly, vol 85, no. 4, 29-48. Dotsey, Michael, Robert G. King, and Alexander L. Wolman (1999): “State Dependent Pricing and the General Equilibrium Dynamics of Money and Output,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. CXIV, issue 2, 655-690. Dotsey, Michael, and Robert G. King (2005): “Implications of State Dependent Pricing for Dynamic Macroeconomic Models,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 213-242. Golosov, Mikhail, Robert E. Lucas (2005): “Menu Costs and Phillips Curves” mimeo. Gertler, Mark and John Leahy (2005): “A Phillips Curve with an Ss Foundation,” mimeo...