Thursday, April 14, 2011
A Brief History of the Fed and the Financial Crisis Part I: The Federal Funds Market and the Alphabet Soup of Programs.
Anyway, Figure 1 shows the relationship between the fed funds rate and a couple other rates.
Figure 1: Fed Funds and Selected Rates
Those two spikes represent huge injections of reserves into the fed funds market. The first was an intervention by the Fed to help prevent problems from the Y2K bug that never materialized. The other is of course in response to the massive disruption to the financial system when lower Manhattan was shut down for several days.
Figure 2 also tells the story of the Federal Reserve's role in the Financial crisis. We see a very, very sharp drop in the Federal Funds rate in 2001. In January of 2001 the Fed cut the fed funds rate from 6% to 5.50%. By the end of 2001 the rate was 1.25%. In Nov 2002 the Fed cut the rate all the way down to .75%. In 2003 the Fed raised rates to 2% and then keeps rates at that level until mid 2004 when it gradually starts (best illustrated by the step pattern in the discount rate) to increase interest rates to a peak of 6.25% in mid 2006.
Those low rates from 2001 to mid 2004 along with the quantity of reserves needed to keep rates that low many people say is a big part of the creation of the housing bubble. Initially, of course, the low rates were intended to juice the economy during the 2001 recession but critics say the Fed kept rates down too long.
I'm actually somewhat agnostic about the Fed's role. They must have had something to do with the housing bubble, but I'm not sure low rates were a sufficient condition. The giant increase in global savings during this period (it basically doubled)--as far as I'm concerned--is the central player in the housing bubble. Maybe we can think of the Fed as the yeast and the global savings glut as the flour. You can make bread without yeast, but it' won't rise. Of course, there are like a million other ways to blame the Fed beyond interest rate policy, such as thier role as a regulator and their refusal to use their ability to jawbone markets.
Also included this graph is the discount rate which, as we discussed in class is supposed to be a kind of "cap" on the federal funds rate. You'll notice several upward spikes. Lets zoom in a little bit:
In late 2008 there are two significant spikes above the discount rate. This is indicative of the beginning of a financial panic. Banks are all scrambling to increase their excess reserves either "just in case" or because they legitimately need them. However some financial institutions may not have wanted to seem as though they needed discount loans and so borrowed at a rate above the discount rate from other banks, not the Fed. The expansion of discount loans through 2008 like the expansion of the fed balance sheet in general is really remarkable. The Fed had already increased its discount loans by about 1800% through 2007, from 27 million to $48.7 billion. From the 4th quarter of 2007 to its peak in 2009q1 the Fed increased the borrowed monetary base to $536.3 billion, an over 100% increase. All told, of course, the Fed increased its direct lending to the financial system by 20,000%!
This is a good place to talk about some of the unprecedented things the Fed did to try to stem the financial panic. It is important to point out that much of the lending the Fed did was not necessarily about maintain the target fed funds rate but was rather the fed fulfilling it's role as "lender of last resort". Credit markets in a financial panic seize up and banks and other financial institutions find it difficult or impossible to find funding. The Fed then steps in to make sure financial institutions can stay afloat. As well, the Fed greases the wheels of the financial system to get it running again.
Not reflected in the loans above were a variety of programs such as the Term Auction Liquidity Facility or TALF. TALF loans were loans in which the collateral is an AAA rated asset backed securities (ABS). ABS of course tipped off the crisis through mortgage backed securities, but the ABS market is much bigger than just mortgages. ABSes finance credit cards, student loans, car loans and other things. Asset backed securities are fundamental to the "shadow banking system" the segment of the financial system that does many of the things banks do (make loans) but aren't actually banks. This market was also in a state of panic which was the justification for the TALF. Related (and a much bigger program) was the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) which was similar to AMLF, but much much bigger.
Finally, there are the Maiden Lane programs (I, II and III). Essentially, these are "shell" companies the Fed created in order to buy assets from Bear Sterns and AIG. The Fed bought some of the uglier holdings of Bear Sterns to make the sale to JP Morgan Chase more attractive (Maiden Lane I) and the Fed bought a bunch of AIG's Mortgage Back Securities (MBS) in order to give AIG the cash needed to meet their obligations (Maiden Lane II). This was over and above the $85 billion line of credit the Fed set up for AIG. Finally, Maiden Lane III was another LLC set up by the Fed (partially owned by AIG). Maiden Lane III was created to buy up the Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) that several banks had take out insurance policies (Credit Default Swaps, or CDOs) on. As the value of the CDOs fell, AIG was obligated to pay these banks the difference between the market value of the CDOs and "par" (what the banks paid for them) value. AIG had already paid about $35 billion (mostly out of the $85 billion the Fed had lent them), the purchase of the CDOs from the banks by the Fed made up another $29 billion or so.
About this this target of 0 to 25 basis points: Importantly missing from Figure 2 is the interest rate the fed pays on deposits by banks at the Fed. When first instituted in October of 2008 the Fed made a distinction between what it would pay for required reserves and for excess reserves but later started paying 25 basis points on all reserves. Now, it may not be obvious from figure 3, but the fed funds rate has actually been below 25 basis points (roughly speaking around 15 basis points). Using the model of the market for reserves in class we came to the conclusion that no one would lend at less than 25 basis points. However, in the real fed funds market there are non-banks that buy and sell reserves (most notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). These non-banks do not have deposits at the Fed though they make overnight loans and they are apparently willing to lend reserves at around 15 basis points.
I'm going to break this post up into two posts:
Part II: Quantitative easing.
Wednesday, April 6, 2011
|Wednesday, 06 April 2011 04:42|
That is what headlines would look like if the United States had an independent press. After all, this is one of the main take aways of the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) analysis of the plan proposed by Representative Paul Ryan, the Republican chairman of the House Budget Committee. Representative Ryan would replace the current Medicare program with a voucher for people who turn age 65 in 2022 and later. This voucher would be worth $8,000 in for someone turning age 65 in that year. It would rise in step with with the consumer price index and also as people age. (Health care expenses are higher for people age 75 than age 65.)
According to the CBO analysis the benefit would cover 32 percent of the cost of a health insurance package equivalent to the current Medicare benefit (Figure 1). This means that the beneficiary would pay 68 percent of the cost of this package. Using the CBO assumption of 2.5 percent annual inflation, the voucher would have grown to $9,750 by 2030. This means that a Medicare type plan for someone age 65 would be $30,460 under Representative Ryan's plan, leaving seniors with a bill of $20,700. (This does not count various out of pocket medical expenditures not covered by Medicare.)
According to the Social Security trustees, the benefit for a medium wage earner who first starts collecting benefits at age 65 in 2030 would be $32,200. (This adjusts the benefit projected by the Social Security trustees [$19,652 in 2010 dollars] for the 2.5 percent annual inflation rate assumed by CBO.) For close to 70 percent of seniors, Social Security is more than half of their retirement income. Most seniors will get a benefit that is less than the medium earners benefit described here since their average earnings are less than that of a medium earner and they start collecting Social Security benefits before age 65.
Furthermore, the portion of income going to health care costs will increase through time according to the CBO analysis. This is due both to aging of individuals and to increasing health care costs through time. As noted insurance for older beneficiaries will cost more than insurance for younger beneficiaries, but Representative Ryan's voucher would still only pay the same amount for their care. This means that if the average 80-year-old cost twice as much to insure as the average 65-year-old, then the premium that would come out of a seniors' pocket would be twice as large. This implies that if the program had been in effect for 15 years in 2030 then the average senior would be paying $41,400 for a Medicare equivalent insurance package in 2030, 25 percent more than the medium earner's benefit in that year.
The other reason that Representative Ryan's plan will lead to rising health care costs for seniors through time is that the voucher payment does not keep pace with health care cost inflation. As costs continue to rise relative to the voucher, seniors will be required to pay a larger portion of their health care costs themselves. It is worth noting that 2030 is only 8 years after the voucher program kicks in.